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Abstract 
 
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to understand how in a situation of a crisis can 
Management Accounting Systems (MAS) create tensions in attention to information between 
top and line managers. 
Design/methodology/approach – The study is based on a field study. 
Findings – The findings based on an attention-based view on organizations demonstrate how 
change to an MAS introduced to handle the crisis failed to integrate top and line managers’ 
attention toward the common issues. Tightening of budget control was an expected response 
in such a situation. However, this change produced rather the opposite result – attention to 
information articulated by the top and line managers became even more disintegrated. This was 
visible in terms of different interpretations of both the reasons and the strategy of how to get 
out of the crisis – this is what we call a tension in attention. 
Research limitations/implications – The study is subject to the usual limitations of case-based 
research. 
Practical implications – Implications from the study is that there is a need for caution about 
how managers move in the beginning of the crisis because the initial response sets a tone and 
trajectory of the crisis. In practice, this means that sense making processes are important in an 
early stage of a crisis to avoid tensions in attention between different groups in the organization. 
Originality/value – The authors argued that little research has been conducted so far regarding 
what information managers focus their attention on in organizations under financial distress 
conditions. The originality is the use of an attention-based view together with organizational 
psychology to understand this area. 
Keywords Management control systems, Financial crisis, Attention, Budgeting, 
Qualitative research methodology 
Paper type Research paper 
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1. Introduction 
When a crisis occurs, nuances of the kind of information managers pay attention to when making 
strategic and operational decisions can have a profound effect on the company’s chances to survive the 
crisis (D’Aveni and MacMillan, 1990). Authors show that top managers in companies with a crisis that 
demands that they survive, pay more attention to external information, while top managers at companies 
that go bankrupt pay more attention to the internal environment. Use of MAS also seems to change 
dramatically during the crisis compared to a situation of non-crisis (Ezzamel & Bourn, 1990; Euske et. 
al., 1993; Collins et. al., 1997; Lin et. al., 2006; Becker et. al., 2015). From the perspective of attention 
to information, the way MAS is used by managers in a situation of crisis can have important 
implications for the firm’s survival, e.g. integrating managerial attention on different levels towards the 
common objectives by e.g. tightening organizational controls (Chenhall, 2003; Czarniawska-Joerges, 
1988).  
 
However, addressing a crisis by tightening organizational controls may jeopardize agility, flexibility 
and dynamics (Bogsnes, 2009; Bhimani & Langfield-Smith, 2007). Despite a few studies (e.g. Frow et. 
al., 2005), we still know little about how MAS contributes to dealing with both dangers and 
opportunities related to organizational crisis. Little research has been done so far regarding what 
information managers focus their attention on in organizations under financial distress conditions. 
Especially, there has been little empirical work on the focus of attention on MAS by managers at 
different levels. 
 
This article builds on data from a case study of a company, TelCo, that demonstrates how change to a 
MAS introduced to handle the crisis failed to integrate top and line managers’ attention towards the 
common issues: a tension in attention. The main research question we address in this article is: how in 
a situation of a crisis can MAS create tensions in attention to information between top and line 
managers?  
 
To analyze the data, the attention-based view of the organization (Ocasio, 2011) and the MAS was 
mobilized as well as organizational psychology literature (Kira and Korpelainen, 2012; Korpelainen 
and Kira, 2013; White, 2009). First, the attention-based view explains how attention is given to 
information in organizations (Ocasio, 2011; Ocasio and Joseph, 2005; March & Olsen, 1976). 
Second, organizational psychology literature is used to characterize how top and line managers perceive 
a new decision-making context and the corresponding changes in MAS that were introduced, with 
particular focus on a perceived work situation that framed managerial attention (Kira and Korpelainen, 
2012; Korpelainen and Kira, 2013; White, 2009). In addition, we use Shivastava´s (1983) framework 
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to highlight the similarities and differences between the top management and the line managers’ views 
and what information they pay most attention to under the situation of crisis.   
 
We demonstrate that tightening budgetary controls by top managers was executed as a response to their 
perceptions of the crisis and demands from investors and the board of directors for improving the short-
term financial results and corresponding cost-cuts. Strengthened top managerial attention to information 
from the budgets should have signaled the new organizational course of action to the line managers 
stimulating cost-cutting actions. This was expected because the incentive system in the organization 
rewarded a cost cutting behavior. However, those changes resulted in the opposite situation: line 
managers challenging the dangers of this new focus on the short-term financial results.  
The result was tension in attention to information by the top and line managers and a disagreement 
between managerial levels regarding the actions and behavior that were appropriate in order to move 
the company out of the crisis.  
 
This article contributes to the research area that focuses on how attention is given to management 
accounting information when an organization operates in a situation of crisis (D’Aveni and MacMillan, 
1990). Management accounting research has provided little or no guidance on the models of 
organizational response to financial crisis (Hopwood, 2009). Recent research in MAS has also focused 
more on the integrative rather than the conflicting nature of information produced as control packages 
(Malmi & Brown, 2008; W O´Grady and Akroyd, 2016). Conflicts and tensions between the use of 
accounting information within an organizational control package is thus a less researched topic 
(Jørgensen and Messner, 2010; Vaivio, 1999). Our article contributes to a better understanding of how 
and why tightening controls during a crisis situation failed to introduce integrated attention to 
management accounting information between the organizational levels, and instead created tensions in 
managerial attention.  
 
Second, this article also contributes to a better understanding of how tension in attention to information 
is influenced by the managerial perceptions of their work situations characterized e.g. by the level of 
congruence between managerial mindset and behavior and thus, their use of accounting information in 
“comfort” and “discomfort” zones (e.g. Bourmistrov & Kaarbøe, 2013). By doing that, we help to 
improve our understanding of the links between management accounting practices and individual 
psychological processes (see e.g. Hall, 2015).  
 
 
2. Attention to management accounting information under condition of 
crisis: the role of MAS, perceived work situations and focus of attention 
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The problem that we address in this article is: how in a situation of a crisis can MAS create tensions in 
attention to information between top and line managers.  
 
2.1. MAS from Perspectives of Managerial Attention-Based Literature 
Traditionally, reasons for and implications of tensions in use of information from MAS on the different 
levels in organizations are examined from a systems approach to MAS  (Otley, 1980). This means that 
companies need information flexibility to meet the needs for information on different managerial levels 
(Nilsson, 2002; Bjørnenak & Olson, 1999), Tensions may appear because the local MAS, which focuses 
on the needs of the line managers and central systems, concentrates on the need of the whole company 
(Bjørnenak & Olson, 1999; Hedberg & Jönsson, 1978).  
 
Contrary to the accounting system and user-oriented view of MAS, we look at use of information from 
MAS from an attention-based view of organizationsMAS can be understood as a part of different 
organizational governance channels of attention distribution (Ocasio, 2011) and function to both 
differentiate and integrate managerial attention between different organizational levels. Ocasio (1997: 
189) defined managerial attention as “… the noticing, encoding, interpreting, and focusing of time and 
effort by organizational decision-makers on both (a) issues: the available repertoire of categories for 
making sense of the environment: problems, opportunities, and threats, and (b) answers: the available 
repertoire of action alternatives: proposals, routines, projects, programs, and procedures.” It means that 
the focus of attention is on the decision-makers’ selectivity of issues and is answered by a cognitive 
process on the individual level.  
 
However, focus of attention is never context free and the organizational architecture shapes the context 
and in this way distributes attention between different organizational levels (Ocasio, 1997). Thus, 
contrary to the system and user-oriented view on management accounting, the attention-based view of 
MAS considers the dynamics of organizational adaptation to its environment as a problem of creating 
an appropriate MAS for attention distribution. The key challenge is to both differentiate attention, i.e. 
create a local, context-specific situated attention, and to integrate attention, i.e. establish an alignment 
of management attention between levels on common (e.g. strategic) issues (Joseph & Ocasio, 2012; 
Ren & Gou, 2011). 
 
 
2.2. Situation of Crisis: Tightening Controls by Top Managers and Its Implication for MAS Use by Line 
Managers 
Situations of crisis can be understood as a very special and extreme case of organizational change that 
requires integrated attention from all organizational members (Vuori & Huy, 2015). A crisis can be 
defined as any relevant factors or conditions that threaten the survival of the organization and indicate 
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inadequate resources to cope with the threat (Starbuck et. al. 1978; Khandwalla, 1978). There can be 
different types of crises: “economic” (e.g. common for an industry), “idiosyncratic” (e.g. unique for a 
company) (Becker et. al. 2015) or even “endemic” (e.g. common for a set of nations) (Collins et. al., 
1997). Crisis can also be analyzed based on a reactive or proactive approach, e.g. with focus on crisis 
avoidance vs. crisis mitigation (Lin et. al. 2006).  
 
By applying attention-based literature to, we identify organizational architecture as a configuration of 
organizational controls and corresponding MAS in order to see how the changes in the configuration 
implicate tensions in attention for the line and top managers. The literature agrees that the natural 
response of top managers to financial crisis is to tighten corporate controls therefore changing attention 
structures in such a way that more attention is paid to information from MAS. By doing this, top 
managers can maintain legitimacy regarding the internal and external parties and signal that a crisis has 
arrived and something should be done about it (Czarniawska-Joerges, 1988).  
 
More generally, accounting literature suggests that in hostile (e.g. stressful, dominating, restrictive) and 
turbulent (e.g. risky, unpredictable, fluctuating, ambitious) environments, a situation of crisis can be a 
more permanent phenomenon and organizations tend to rely on more formal control tools such as 
organizational stabilizers (Chenhall, 2003). In such situations, the choice of MAS used to handle the 
crisis can be limited and defined by external stakeholders in a search for predictability and assurance. 
Therefore, especially in a situation of crisis, it can be problematic for top managers to use different sets 
of accounting measures for communicating with external and internal actors.  
 
The challenging side of tightened controls is that organizations can lose agility, flexibility and dynamics 
and take managerial attention away from emerging opportunities (Bogsnes, 2009). Thus, especially over 
time, organizations face a need to replace or delicately balance attention to tight controls with attention 
to more flexible controls (Chenhall, 2003; Czarniawska-Joerges, 1988). Supplementing centralization 
of controls during the crisis with improved attention to informal communication channels can give the 
flexibility needed (Prechel, 1994). However, the balance between the tight top-down control and the 
flexibility of local controls – with their implications for information use – can be difficult to reconcile 
(Bogsnes, 2009; Meer-Kooistra & Scapens, 2008; Bhimani & Langfield-Smith, 2007; Frow et. al., 
2005).  
 
In organizations with strong hierarchies, local managers can find it difficult to bypass, ignore or 
sabotage the formally established top-down control authority lines and use of the corresponding MAS 
associated within those accountability lines. It might be possible with more local control in 
organizations where the work of line managers is strongly dependent on strong professional values and 
cultures (e.g. Abernethy & Vagnoni, 2004; Nyland et. al., 2009). A possible solution for line managers 
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to achieve flexibility under the tight top-down control regime is to de-couple or loosely-couple attention 
from use of formal controls (Nyland and Pettersen, 1996; Høgheim et. al. 1989, Meyer and Rowan, 
1977). This means that attention to information on different levels in organizations can deviate from 
what is intended by the MAS design (Mouritsen, 2005; Ahrens & Chapman, 2004; Marginson, 2002; 
Mellemvik, et. al., 1988). This can especially be expected in time of crisis. Therefore, we ask in the 
situation of crisis, how did the top managers change the configuration of the MAS and what are the 
consequences of this configuration change for the line managers’ attention to top managers’ agenda 
communicated through MAS? 
 
2.3. Situation of Crisis: Changes in Perceived Work Situation by Top and Line Managers 
Based on the attention view to MAS, a crisis creates a special decision-making context for situated 
attention requiring changes in sensemaking processes, because otherwise the crisis can get out of control 
(Weick, 1988). In addition, a crisis produces a highly emotionally charged atmosphere for decision-
making, characterized not only by uncertainty but also by confusion, anxiety, excitement, fear, and 
anger (Sayegh et. al., 2004). The role of emotions in using MAS has generally been little researched 
(Hall, 2015). For instance, the study of Vuori & Huy (2015) demonstrated that a work situation 
characterized by shared fear emotions by both top and line managers hindered integration of attention 
in order to deal appropriately with a crisis for Nokia’s smart phone market. 
 
In order to assess properly the decision-making context under the situation of crisis in terms of how 
managers choose their focus of attention, definitions of perceived work situations by organizational 
psychologists can be useful (Kira and Korpelainen, 2012; Korpelainen and Kira, 2013; White, 2009). 
These incorporate both mental/emotional as well as behavioral aspects of a perceived work situation. 
According to authors, a perceived work situation can be characterized by a perceived congruence 
between decision-makers “mindset” (e.g. work identities, attitudes towards what is right to do, 
emotions) and actual “behavior” at work (e.g. actions to be done to complete the work). In a “comfort” 
zone, the mindset and behavior correspond to each other, e.g. anxiety-neutral and uncertainty-avoiding 
mindset favors routine and repetitive behavior. Similarly, a mindset of an individual in favor of a 
continued challenge at work would positively apprise experimentation/non-routine behavior as also 
constituting a “comfort” zone. Contrary, a “discomfort” zone would be characterized by a negative 
appraisal of a work situation streaming from a misalignment between established mindset and behavior, 
e.g. anxiety-neutral mindset forced to produce innovative behavior under conditions of uncertainty or 
produce non-routine behavior.  
 
From the discussion above, we can thus expect that a crisis can change decision-maker’s perceived 
work situation by e.g. challenging the existing mindset or influencing the behavior or both, therefore 
moving decision-makers from an established “comfort” zone to a “discomfort” zone or a new type of 
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“comfort” zone. The emotional responses can follow as a result of and/or indicate a misalignment 
between behavior and mindset. In this sense, it is interesting to see what the role of MAS is under those 
circumstances contributing to change in mindset and behavior. In this respect, the interesting question 
is: under the situation of crisis how has a new configuration of MAS contributed to changes in perceived 
work situations by top and line managers?  
 
2.4. Situation of crisis: the 4Cs of focus of attention 
Based on the attention view to MAS, the third element to be examined is the focus of attention, i.e. what 
are the issues and answers that both line and top managers pay attention to under the situation of crisis. 
In this sense, Shrivastava’s (1983) framework can be useful because it focuses on four special aspects 
of a crisis (called the 4Cs): “causes”, “consequences”, “caution” and “coping”. “Causes” include issues 
and answers that focus managerial attention on the immediate, perceived failures that caused the crisis 
and the antecedent conditions that allowed failure to occur. “Consequences” are perceived issues and 
answers in terms of the immediate and long-term impacts. “Caution” includes the perceptions of 
measures needed to prevent or minimize the impact of a potential crisis. Finally, “coping” comprises 
measures taken to respond to the crises that have already occurred. The 4C framework can be useful to 
highlight the similarities and differences between the top management and the line managers’ views 
and what information they pay most attention to under the situation of crisis. In this respect, the 
interesting question is proposed to the situation of crisis: how have the changing configuration of MAS 
and the changes in perceived work situations contributed to forming the focus of attention by top and 
line managers?  
 
3. Method  
The choice of the company for this study was totally coincidental. One of the authors had supervised 
candidates who attended management control specialization during the master’s program while been 
employed in TelCo as controllers. The student wrote a master’s thesis about the company1. However, 
this routine assignment, which was meant to focus on a description of MAS in a company called TelCo, 
has turned out to be somewhat unusual since the students discovered that there seemed to be tension, 
frustration and confusion related to how management accounting was functioning in the company. The 
empirical context was especially interesting since the confusion and tension were related to the company 
being in financial difficulties and also the ways in which the information from the company’s MAS was 
used.  
 
3.1. Priorities 
                                                          
1 Gabrielsen, S. & Jelstad, L. (2010) ‘Beyond Budgeting – Den rette medisin? En studie av økonomistyring i 
TelCo’, Master Thesis.  
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This interesting and unusual setting in TelCo motivated the authors of this article to work further and 
establish a research group for planning and realizing data collection, analysis and interpretations. TelCo, 
at the time of the study, was a middle-sized corporation of about 800 employees and organized into 
three corporate cost centers in addition to corporate HQs (see Appendix 1 for a simplified organization 
chart). The main priority of the study was to uncover in-depth how these conflicts in information use 
emerged and in what sense the tension could be attributed to the ways the MAS is designed. The data 
collection started in the fall of 2009, but the majority of interviews were conducted during the spring of 
2010, when the company experienced the culmination of the crisis. Some additional enquiries and 
clarifications were made in early spring 2011 and 2014. In addition, the draft of the article was 
commented on by a consultant who worked in the company in the time of crisis. This primary data 
collection was combined with data collection from both closed sources e.g. TelCo’s budgets, reporting 
guidelines as well as open sources, including newspaper publications about the company, analytical 
articles and information on the Internet, etc. Interviews were used to collect and create descriptions of 
how respondents had perceived challenges for MAS functioning. A convenience sample was chosen to 
collect data from the managers to which researchers had access. This primarily concerned managers 
and controllers in one of the cost centers (e.g. TelCo Networks/Wholesale).  
 
3.2. Choices 
Even though this research had close contacts with the company, the initial case study conducted was 
mainly of an exploratory and non-interventionist nature (Lukka, 2005). The target was to refine prior 
theory (Keating, 1995) and better understand the social world of managers and the functions of social 
constructs such as management information systems in the light of the context of managerial work 
(Alvesson & Sköldberg, 1994). Primarily, data on which the stories are reported in this article was 
collected from formal and informal interviews with 10 employees at the company.  Five in-depth semi-
structured interviews were conducted (see Appendix 2 for overview of the respondents). The 
respondents were two top managers on the level of the corporation and three line managers. In addition, 
our understanding of the situation is based on many informal conversations with three managers and 
two controllers. Formal interviews lasted for about 45 minutes to one hour each. Open-ended questions 
were used to allow interviewees to explain the challenges they experienced and to link these challenges 
to both their managerial practices and the information they placed attention on (for interview guide see 
Appendix 3).  
 
When interpreting the formal interviews and informal conversations, the focus was on the following 
major themes indicating issues and answers the managers were preoccupied with: a) what caused the 
crisis, b) how did they cope with the crisis and what caution action was taken, and c) what kind of 
consequences did they expect from the crisis and what challenges did they meet using the existing 
information from the management control systems.  
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3.3. Challenges 
By choosing managers from only one cost center, there can be a bias where the respondents were more 
critical towards use of information from MAS. However, we evaluated this as not being a problem, it 
was not to find out whether the respondents were negative to MAS practice as such, but to explore what 
was the nature of the challenges they experienced and why, thus providing us with necessary 
information about conflicts and tensions in attention between line and top managers. To be sure, we 
have also collected data from one line manager in another cost center (TelCo Markets).   
 
 
4. Tensions in Managerial Attention in a Company in Crisis: Case of a 
Telecommunication Company TelCo 
In this section, an introduction is given to the case company TelCo by describing its development prior 
to occurrence of the crisis together with presentation of different stories told by both line and top 
managers  
 
4.1 Background: TelCo and its MAS Prior to the Culmination of the Crisis  
At the time of study, TelCo Company was the second largest producer of complete telecommunication 
services to private and businesses customers in the country. Several regional and national energy 
producers and broadband companies were the owners/investors.  
The competitive advantage of the company was to be based on the access to a rather wide 
telecommunication infrastructure, a large customer database and the wide range of services provided. 
The company had a strategy of a growth through a chain of strategic market expansions. TelCo had 
expanded its operational volume during several years prior to the crisis by a number of takeovers and 
acquisitions of other regional and national telecommunication companies in the industry. The strategy 
was to acquire broadband companies with an established customer portfolio and infrastructure in order 
to gain economy of scale and cost-efficiency. Some of the companies TelCo had taken over had gone 
bankrupt or were on the edge of bankruptcy.  
 
TelCo operated in a dynamic industry with a high level of turbulence and with many dramatic changes 
introduced over the decade. Many acquisitions and buyouts were the essential characteristic of TelCo’s 
domestic market. This meant that the number of major market actors was constantly decreasing at the 
same time as TelCo became larger. Under such conditions, price competition became more serious.  
 
Prior to the crisis, TelCo managers were relying on use of information from both traditional annual 
budgets and the Balanced Scorecard (BSC). The purpose of the budgeting process in TelCo was to 
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establish quantitative objectives and action plans for the coming year – with strong focus on EBITDA.  
The top-down approach in budgeting was always supplemented with a bottom-up approach where line-
managers were involved in setting up their local budgets based on the budget numbers provided from 
the top. The CFO, who was interviewed prior to the culmination of the crisis in spring 2010, expressed 
the importance of this approach like this: 
“It is important for TelCo that line managers have ownership and responsibility for 
meeting their budgets… At the same time, we have to avoid using unnecessarily much 
time to revise unrealistic budgets… The combination of a top-down budget followed by 
a bottom-up approach has therefore been a solution for us.” 
 
Usually, a series of adjustment rounds were necessary to approve the budget by the top management of 
TelCo (from informal conversations). An approved budget was then finally presented to the board at 
the end of the year. To complement the annual budget, the company also practiced preparation of 
quarterly forecasts for the following 12 months. 
 
Since 2005, in addition to the traditional budgeting process, TelCo had introduced the Balanced 
Scorecard (BSC) (see Appendix 4). Following the introduction of BSC, the company had established 
overall strategic plans that contained information about the overall business idea, visions and the main 
strategic areas (see Appendix 4). From informal conversations, we know that the main idea for the 
introduction of the BSC was to move the focus away from the bottom line of the budget and financial 
accounting. The attention was supposed to be towards the vision of the company and on actions to attain 
those visions in the everyday activities of the company by focusing on the strategy map and causality 
between elements on it (Appendix 4). 
 
The use of both the annual budgets and the KPIs in the BSC had implications for operation of the 
incentive system. The line managers had bonus arrangements, which were divided into two parts: a joint 
(group) bonus related to the realization of the EBITDA parameter in relation to the corporate budget 
and an individual bonus related to particular financial KPIs in the BSC. Examples for such KPIs would 
be related to the reduction of costs of salaries for the concrete unit of responsibility or to implement 
successful renegotiation of a large supply agreement that reduced the costs for the company. Non-
financial KPIs were not part of the reward systems. Bonuses would also have to be related to the fact 
of simply the keeping cost frameworks instituted by the annual budgets.  
 
4.2 The culmination of the crisis: Worsening financial situation leads to tightening controls and 
streamlining the MAS around the budget 
The strategy of growth in TelCo had not been translated into the positive financial figures for several 
years. Already in 2008 and 2009, the loss figures in the consolidated accounts started to climb up from 
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respectively -25 million EURO to respectively -46 million EURO. In year 2010, the company has 
budgeted an EBITDA2 of about 47 million EURO, but the profit after taxes was budgeted to a figure of 
-24 million EURO. However, already after the first quarter of 2010, the EBITDA figure deviated 
negatively by 1.5 million EURO from what was budgeted in 2009. In addition, the adjusted annual 
financial forecast produced after the first quarter of 2010 had shown an additional negative annual 
budget deviation for 2010 of about 6 million EURO.  
 
The difficult financial situation in the company throughout 2008 and 2009 had effects on the 
relationships between top and line managers. For instance, from informal conversations we know that 
it was becoming more and more difficult for the top and line managers to come to an agreement during 
budget adjustments and discussions. Worsening financial situations and increasingly demanding 
requests from owners, investors and also creditors had influenced the annual budgeting process. The 
culmination came during the fall of 2009 when the budget preparation for the year 2010 took a much 
longer time in relation to the initial schedule set up by the board. Because of negative EBITDA figures 
reported over several years, both the owners of the company and its creditors had requested that TelCo 
would show a positive cash flow in 2010. Negotiations between the top and line managers to establish 
a realistic budget were very difficult and lengthy. This resulted in several immense cost cuts elaborated 
by the top management in the final version of the budget for 2010 without consulting the line managers. 
 
Because the financial situation had worsened even further in the first quarter of 2010, the top corporate 
managers had put pressure on the line managers to cut even more costs and quickly. Because of this 
requirement, the negative budget deviation reported in the first quarter of 2010 had an immediate impact 
on the annual investment budget previously approved by the board for 2010. The corporate managers 
were asked to review again the earlier approved investment budget for 2010 and reduce it 
correspondingly by 6 million EURO to secure the positive net cash flow requested by the board for 
2010.  
 
4.3 Tensions in Attentions while Using Management Accounting Information: Stories from Line and 
Top Managers  
In the sub-sections below, we report evidence from both line and top managers when they were facing 
both a difficult financial situation as well as an increasingly top-down nature of the budgeting process.  
 
4.3.1 Stories from Line Managers: A Lost Balance Between Cost and Value Focuses 
 
                                                          
2 EBITDA – Earnings Before Interest, Tax, Depreciation and Amortization. 
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Story from line manager 1: “Impossible to reconcile cost cuts and improvement of telecom services 
quality”  
In the first story, the director of the service delivery department argued that the crisis has become a kind 
of “vicious circle”. The budget cost cuts came about because of poorly executed growth long-term 
strategies without paying attention towards simultaneously gaining efficiency. The corporate managers 
seemed to fail to restructure acquired companies in proper time and they had difficulties with 
harmonization of different internal systems3. The direct consequence of the crisis was the necessity of 
cutting costs now. In his department, this led to increasing delivery time for the fiber connections. The 
director felt to be in a kind of “hostage situation”: the situation of being unable to resolve the tension 
of choosing between maintaining a high level of quality and demands for cost cuts. He explained his 
tension in attention in the following way:  
“Our customers complain that it takes too much time to deliver. It is impossible to get 
new customers when our reputation tells them that it takes too much time for us to 
deliver compared to our competitors! I am pretty sure that delivery time has increased 
because of the large focus on cost cuts. I am caught between the tough requirements for 
the quality of services and the demands of cost cuts. The main operational KPIs for my 
department are related to “delivery time” and “delivery in accordance with 
specifications”.  
 
The tension is that the financial KPI focusing on “the cost of services delivered,” which is taken from 
the annual budget, and the process KPIs from the BSC focusing on “delivery time” and “delivery in 
accordance with specifications” were on a collision course because these two required a different set of 
actions. For the year 2010, the department had a financial goal of cutting “the cost of services delivered” 
by about 1 million EURO. The director exclaimed: 
“It is difficult to cut costs and at the same time maintain the high level of delivery”. 
 
The line manager meant that the focus of top management on cost cuts through use of budgets stimulates 
a short-term orientation. For example, use of the budget resulted in dysfunctional behavior of cutting 
out “expensive” agreements with sub-contractors, but it also resulted in losing large parts of the sub-
contracting network, which was damaging from a long-term perspective.  
 
The new way of doing the budget work had not given much ownership and empowerment to line 
managers as the bottom-up process no longer applied in the company. In his view, coping with the crisis 
would require even more empowerment of the line managers. The line manager argued that with poor 
                                                          
3 TelCo have introduced a Sigma-project to harmonize systems between the different units, but this was introduced 
after the time period we are interested in this article. 
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financial performance, corporate managers had placed too much decision authority over the local 
matters without understanding the nuances of work in the different divisions. Thus, the top executives 
should have been cautious in the way they disregarded the local knowledge of the line managers. Budget 
started to be exclusively a cost-cutting device. This hindered corporate managers from giving authority 
to the line managers so that they could act in order to reach the KPIs in the Balanced Scorecard, which 
translates TelCo’s long-term strategy.  
 
Story from line manager 2:  “Consequences for investments decisions: BSC – “yes”, as long as 
improved quality of services; Budget – “wait and see.” 
In the second story, the director of the technology department in TelCo expressed his frustration over 
the current situation he was experiencing. His job was to make an investment budget for TelCo and 
previously he had the authority to initiate planned investments into the fiber networks around the 
country. In his understanding, the cause of the crisis was TelCo losing dynamics, in terms of adaptation 
abilities, to intensifying market competition. Therefore, the subsequent cuts on investment costs would 
jeopardize the necessary quality of infrastructure to meet increasing competition currently and 
especially in the future. This was because it would take a great deal of time to build the necessary 
infrastructure (e.g. making agreements and entering into the contracts with sub-contractors). It was 
necessary to make right investment decisions quickly to stay up-to-date with a technology that changes 
quickly. 
 
However, he now needed a new approval from the corporate management for all investments over 
29,000 EURO. He provided an example. A network between two big cities should be built in order to 
handle large and important customers in one of the regions. This would require a one-time investment 
of a relatively small amount of 35,000 EURO. This amount was previously elaborated in the budget of 
the department for 2010. The timing of the investment (i.e. now) would be crucial because it could take 
up to 12 weeks for the delivery of equipment from a subcontractor. However, under the new budgeting 
regime, a new approval was required by the top management before the investment could take place. If 
extra time was spent waiting for the final approval for this investment application, valuable time would 
be lost. The technical director explained his frustration over the tension in attention like this:  
“We use too much time in order to make investment applications that are good enough 
to get funds for activities we mean are right to do. We often get the application back 
with questions about whether it is possible to implement the investment with lower costs. 
This shows a lack of confidence from top managers in our local interpretation of the 
long-term strategy. I think we know best about what is most profitable in the long-term. 
Time spent on evaluation of applications is better spent on value creation in the 
company. There is too much focus on getting the lowest possible level of costs and not 
on having the right level of costs.”    
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Therefore, the technical director had insufficient understanding why this detailed control was needed. 
The focus of BSC indicators implied that all investments that improve the quality of services should be 
made. The focus on information from the budget led to unnecessary discussions around whether similar 
investments could be done cheaper or postponed. In this sense, there should be caution regarding 
investment dynamics in the organization experiencing the crisis, and not paying attention to this was 
quite dangerous for minimizing effects of the crisis. In his opinion, the line managers and employees at 
the departments knew best how to cope with the crisis and what investments should be made to realize 
the indicated strategies.  
 
Story from line manager 3: “Problems of customers relations: Budget rewarded new sales but 
disregarded maintaining relations with existing customers.” 
As a third story, we provide a report from the interview with the director of sales. In his opinion, the 
crisis was caused by an uncontrolled growth strategy. For his business unit this meant mostly acquisition 
of new customers all the time. Consequently, the performance of the business unit he was responsible 
for was measured by how many new sales the unit produced. But, making new sales was only one part 
of the story as there were different types of customers and there were always two types of salespersons 
to take care of those. The “hunters” were out in the market obtaining new customers. The “KAMs” (key 
account managers) were those who worked with maintaining the largest and therefore the most 
important customers. Their performance was measured based on their maintenance of the customer 
portfolio. For KAMs, it was important to work with service quality and customer satisfaction in order 
to maintain customers. The consequence of the crisis was that less focus was actually placed on 
designing appropriate reward systems for KAMs.  
 
Thus, the director experienced a hopelessness in the situation since he could not make good sales 
agreements for the KAMs salespersons and he blamed the new system for this. According to the 
company's strategy, both categories of salespersons were important for the long-term strategy. But, only 
the budget information was used to design the incentive system for both salespersons. For instance, it 
was difficult to get reliable information to design good incentives for KAMs under the condition of the 
top-down budget domination. In addition, for the “hunters”, a budget-based bonus system introduced a 
“ceiling” in the bonus system motivated by the need to cut costs. According to the manager, the 
consequence was that the best sales persons who could bring in more customers would no longer be 
equally motivated to extend their efforts as soon as their sales met the budget figure. When elaborating 
sales budgets, individuals were usually very conservative. He expressed it in this way: 
“Wide use of sales bonuses related to sales budgets leads to a defensive budgeting of 
sales volumes.”  
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Thus, coping with the crisis would mean moving away from the existing system where the budget 
dominated in setting up sales agreements. Coping would require improving the system in a way that it 
rewarded “right sales”, e.g. higher rewards for sales with higher margins.  
 
4.3.2. Stories of corporate managers: Without positive cash flows the investor and bank relations end. 
According to the CEO and CFO, the lower level of corporate growth in recent years created a problem 
of compensating for higher operational costs at the company. CEO explained:  
“Before, [when the company had a growth] the company could have compensated for 
higher costs with higher sales, but now the marked is stabilized and we don’t have the 
growth situation we experienced before. Thus, we need to consolidate our efforts and 
see how things will develop.” 
 
The consequence of the crisis was that the corporate management experienced tremendous pressure 
from investors who were losing money on their investments in Telco. The board of directors had used 
the budget as a tool for introducing stricter control over the corporate management. Investors in TelCo 
had not earned any money from their investments in the company during the period 2007 – 2009. From 
informal conversations and documents, we know that some “more patient” investors argued publically 
that TelCo was still in the market establishment stage and therefore their investment in TelCo could be 
considered as a long-term investment strategy. However, they needed to defend development with 
respect to their investments in TelCo to their corporate boards and, thus, used budget and accounting 
information from TelCo for this purpose. Although many hoped that profit would come in the future, 
some of the investors had run out of patience at the end of 2009 since the value of their investment was 
decreasing dramatically over time.  
 
Annual budget and financial information was also important for the banks, which asked for 3-year 
financial plans. Without showing positive liquidity, TelCo could have huge problems in refinancing 
their existing loans from the banks as banks had very strong covenants and conditions related to loan 
agreements.  
 
According to the CEO and CFO, despite the fact of having a long-term strategy at TelCo that was 
depicted in the BSC, the short-term financial indicators in the budget were becoming the most important 
indicators for maintaining relations with owners and banks. The message had been clear from the 
investors:  there would not be more investments from owners, meaning that the company should manage 
investments from its operational income. Budget would be essential for communication with the 
corporate board, investors and banks, while BSC would not – it is only an internal device to 
communicate long-term strategy.  
 
16 
 
The situation culminated in March 2010. The CEO was presented with the updated quarterly financial 
forecasts and he recognized that it would be necessary to reduce the annual EBITDA requirements after 
the first quarter in the budget with 6 million EURO compared to what was originally budgeted for 2010. 
He could not find any other solution than to reduce the investment budget accordingly by a decree in 
order to secure a positive cash flow at the end of the year. At the same time, the CFO introduced a 
tougher investment policy at TelCo. Because the owners of the corporation were so preoccupied with 
the EBITDA and the corresponding cash flow, the short-term goal was to secure a positive cash flow 
by the end of 2010 by all means. The CEO defended this short-term goal under the crisis with the 
following arguments:  
“If we don’t earn enough money, what would we have to manage afterward? The 
answer is the cash flow – if we don’t have cash flow, the bank stops lending.”  
 
Thus, the CEO was preoccupied with securing liquidity and the satisfaction of investors, and solving 
the short-term financial problem was on his mind. Banks and owners wanted predictability and security, 
and the financial plans and renewed investment policies were important in demonstrating that. 
Therefore, corporate managers identified the budget as an important link between investors and their 
work to influence the rest of organization for which they had responsibility.  
 
The budget had thus an important role of translating ambitions and goals for financial plans, which 
would provide the foundation for the final investment budget on the level of line managers. The most 
important thing for the budget was to focus on revision of strategy plans each time the budget was 
developed. According to the top managers, the most important function of the budget was to identify 
and cut costs that were not related to creating value. Furthermore, the top managers argued for the 
importance of the message of cost cutting behavior as such to the line managers, and that this should be 
communicated each time the forecast and the budget revisions were made. Such a message was, 
according to informal communication, good to have because it was a motivation for trying to do things 
differently and more efficiently. Since the beginning of 2010, TelCo’s corporate management tightened 
controls and restricted the delegation of authority to the line managers. Top managers meant that line 
managers in a situation of crisis should fight for each decision. They believed that this approach was 
actually functioning because the amount of investments required to meet their target actually went 
down. 
 
However, top managers were not naïve in terms of relying only on the annual budget for managing the 
organization in conditions of a rapidly changing business environment. Caution was indeed needed in 
formulating the annual budget and then in using it during the condition of turbulent markets. The CFO 
in TelCo, for instance, expressed: 
“In this industry we don’t know how the world will look in the next quarter of the year!”  
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The annual budget, thus, was recognized as rigid and inflexible and it needed to be supplemented with 
updated information. Therefore, the top managers had to use other tools to monitor what was going on 
in the business environment. Use of the annual budget was supplemented with continuous financial 
forecasts at the corporate level. According to the CFO, the budget was actually no longer actively used 
after the first quarter of the year because the annual budget was already “dead” as such. Management 
on the corporate level was performed by the active use of forecasts, which were produced monthly on 
the aggregate level starting from March each year. These were forecasts related not only to financial 
indicators but also to salaries. Based on these forecasts, corporate managers could establish new 
priorities in order to take advantage of newly emerging opportunities in the market and to use money 
for measures that should be given a priority. 
 
4.4. Summary of Findings: Tensions in Managerial Attention by Line and Corporate managers in 
TelCo 
In the sections above, we have presented the description of how TelCo experienced a worsening 
economic situation. The company growth through a series of mergers and acquisitions was not matched 
by archiving economies of scale and cost savings. This worsening financial situation in the period 2007 
– 2010 led to more demanding requirements from investors to improve operational cash-oriented 
performance (measured and communicated through EBITDA). The top managers tried to remedy the 
situation by tightening the budgetary process and reducing the involvement of line managers in 
discussions of the budget because of the experience that this was time consuming.  
 
The managerial attention to the crisis and to information from budgets and BSC have also been 
presented as four different accounts. These are summarized in Table 1 in terms of “causes”, 
“consequences” as well as description of the perceived work situation and tensions in attention 
regarding what to do about the crisis, i.e. “coping” and “caution” strategies. These findings are discussed 
in the next section. 
Table 1. Findings from four accounts through use of 4C framework: Issues and answers of 
managerial attention in the time of crisis. 
 
Story 1 
Line manager 1 
(service   
department) 
Story 2 
Line manager 2 
(technical 
department) 
Story 3 
Line manager 3 
(sales         
department) 
Story 4 
Top managers 
(CEO and CFO) 
“Causes” Cost cuts are results 
of previously poorly 
executed long-term 
strategies (e.g. too 
quick growth) 
The company has lost 
the opportunity to be 
flexible and follow 
the market 
requirements for 
technology 
The company focuses 
too much on 
acquiring new (less 
on maintaining good 
relationships with 
existing) customers  
Lower level of a 
corporate growth in 
recent years created a 
problem of 
compensating for 
higher operational 
costs 
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“Consequences” Cost cuts increase 
delivery time and  
reduce quality of 
services; increasing 
complaints from 
customers about 
delivery time for 
fiber connections; 
losing position in a 
sub-contracting 
network 
Cut on investment 
costs jeopardizes the 
necessary quality of 
infrastructure to meet 
increasing 
competition because 
it takes time to build 
necessary 
infrastructure (e.g. 
making agreements 
with sub-contractors) 
Less focus on 
maintaining relations 
with already existing, 
large volume/ 
portfolio customers 
that needed to be 
retained 
Investors lose money 
on their investments 
in Telco. They run out 
of patience and write 
off some of the 
investments in TelCo. 
Investments should be 
made from operations 
– no external 
additional funding 
will be provided 
 
Perceived work 
situation in 
terms of tension 
in attention 
A hopeless situation 
of the impossibility 
of reconciling cost 
cuts built into the 
budget (“cost of 
service delivered”) 
and increase of 
quality built into the 
BSC, KPIs (e.g. 
“delivery time”)  
Experience 
frustration in waiting 
for approvals from 
the top for even small 
investment decisions: 
contradiction 
between the focus of 
BSC on making all 
type of investments 
that improve quality 
of services vs. budget 
that leads to 
unnecessary 
discussions and waste 
of time 
Problem of making 
good sales bonus 
agreements: budget 
favors salespersons 
attracting new 
customers; while BSC 
favors both 
salespersons 
attracting new 
customers as well as 
key account managers 
maintaining relations 
with existing 
customers 
Budget is essential for 
communication with 
the corporate board, 
investors and banks; 
BSC is not – it is an 
internal device to 
communicate long-
term strategy 
internally  
“Coping” – 
measures to 
repair the 
impact 
Better empowerment 
of line managers in 
the corporate 
planning work 
Trust to line 
managers’ 
interpretation of the 
long-term strategy 
 
Move away from the 
budget in setting up 
sales agreements 
Budget is a tool to 
require cost cuts from 
line mangers: a device 
to ask to do things 
differently and more 
efficiently 
“Caution” – 
measures to 
minimize the 
impact 
Attention to nuances 
of departments and 
how do these 
departments 
contribute to the 
long-term strategy 
Quick investments in 
new technology are 
indispensable in 
turbulent markets in 
order to gain/retain 
customers 
Important to design 
an incentive system 
that rewards “right 
sales, e.g. higher 
rewards for sales with 
higher margins 
Recognition that 
budget is dead after 3 
months, use of rolling 
forecasts to stay 
informed  
 
5. Discussion 
The problem that we address in this article is how a situation of crisis can create tensions in attention to 
information between top and line managers in. Below we discuss major findings by revisiting research 
questions posed in the literature review section. 
 
5.1. Tensions in Attention: The tightened top-down budgeting control under the situation of crisis has 
failed to integrate managerial attention on different levels 
In line with previous findings and our expectations, TelCo’s top managers had tightened controls due 
to increasing pressure from external parties, e.g. investors, owners, creditors. Thus, the new budgeting 
process can be seen as an organizational stabilizer reflecting a new (and apparently a very problematic) 
nature of external – internal relationships in times of extreme unpredictability and turbulence (Chenhall, 
2003). The change in the budgeting process signaled the legitimacy of concerns from organizational 
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stakeholders (Bhimani, 2009; Kraus & Lind, 2010). This finding is also in line with Becker et. al. (2015) 
who showed that companies emphasize certain budgeting functions over others during economic crises.  
 
What seems to be different compared to previous studies and our expectations is how those changes in 
the budgeting process have influenced the behavior of line managers. The expectation was that the line 
managers would pay increasing attention to messages from the top managers and follow those by 
introducing actions resulting in cost cuts. Instead in the stories told by the line managers, it seems that 
they did not share the concerns of the corporate managers. Emotionally-laden line manager responses 
indicate that they objected and even protested short-term thinking and blind cost cuts imposed on them 
from the top. The result was visible tensions in attention to information conveyed through the new 
budgeting process. This supports the argument that the delicate balance between the tight top-down 
control and flexibility of local controls can be difficult to reconcile (Bogsnes, 2009; Meer-Kooistra & 
Scapens, 2008; Bhimani & Langfield-Smith, 2007; Frow et. al, 2005), especially in times of crisis. 
 
In general, tensions can be constructive if those lead to internal dialogue between top and line managers 
in order to find a common platform for how to mitigate the crisis (Lin et. al., 2006). This did not seem 
to be in the case for TelCo, since dialogue between top and line levels seemed to be threatened by the 
top-down nature of the new budgeting procedures. This means that, at least in the short-term, tightening 
the budgeting process failed to integrate line managers’ attention and bring it in line with the concerns 
of the top managers. Even though the previous literature has found that it is not “what get measured that 
gets done” but “what the top managers give attention to that gets done” (Catasus et. al, 2009), our study 
demonstrates that top managerial attention to the new budgeting procedures was not enough to get line 
managers to pay attention to similar issues.  
 
5.2. The effect of tightened budgetary control under the situation of crisis: “comfort” zone for top 
managers and “discomfort” zone for line managers 
According to Weick (1988), tightening budgetary control produces limitations on what the perceived 
legitimate problems under the crisis can be and, thus, impacts the decision-making context. 
Organizational psychology literature would analyze this problem since managers operate in different 
perceived working situations, either characterized by a “comfort” or “discomfort” zone (Kira and 
Korpelainen, 2012; Korpelainen and Kira, 2013; White, 2009). Compared to previous studies and our 
expectations, tightening the budgetary control affected the perceived work situations of both line and 
top managers differently.  Top managers seemed to operate in the work situation characterized by a 
“comfort” zone. It is a decision-making context characterized by a positive emotional appraisal of a 
work situation streaming from an alignment between mindset and behavior (Kira and Korpelainen, 
2012; Korpelainen and Kira, 2013; White, 2009). Indeed, in the case studied, the top managers defined 
the trajectory of how the crisis would unfold and they set a tone for tightening the budgetary controls. 
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The top managers appeared to operate in a financial performance-orientated mindset seems to be in 
congruence with the acceptance of cost cutting behavior.  
 
On the contrary, the line managers appeared to be operating in a working situation characterized by a 
“discomfort” zone. A “discomfort” zone is a decision-making context characterized by a negative 
emotional appraisal of a work situation stemming from a misalignment between mindset and behavior 
(Kira and Korpelainen, 2012; Korpelainen and Kira, 2013; White, 2009). The notion that the line 
managers’ knowledge was not needed anymore in order to bring the organization out of the crisis 
produced discomfort and strong emotional responses. When reading and re-reading the stories of line 
managers, it seems that their narratives are emotionally leaden.  
 
Those stories indicate directly or indirectly “frustration”, “unfairness”, “hopelessness” and their 
“confusion” over the situation they experienced. For instance, this concerns the fact that they were no 
longer to be consulted when formulating the corporate budget or that their concerns about quality or 
maintaining present customer portfolios seemed to be ignored. Another indication of discomfort is that 
they were also engaging in the “blame game”, making the top managers solely responsible for the crisis 
and therefore inappropriateness of the current local actions required by the corporate top level.  
 
Thus, tightening the top-down budgetary control seemed to change the notion of what behavior is 
expected (and also rewarded as appropriate) locally from the line managers: emphasizing predicable 
cost cuts. However, this new expected and required behavior was clearly in conflict with the existing 
mindset of line managers, which focused on notions of serving markets, emphasizing the quality and 
maintaining the loyalty of customers. Even though the line managers might also see a downward 
financial trend, their mental model implies that the only possible solution is to make rapid adjustments 
to market changes.  
 
5.3. In a “discomfort” zone, line managers search for “comfort” by switching their attention to KPIs 
in the Balanced Scorecard 
From the stories of managers, we see that tightening the budgeting procedures led top managers to 
operate in a “comfort” zone while line managers operated in a “discomfort” zone. This can explain why 
focus in attention towards the crisis in terms of “causes”, “consequences”, “coping” and “cautions” are 
different. This can also explain why the top managers paid different attention to the use of budgets and 
forecasts, while the line managers increasingly referred to KPIs in the Balanced Scorecard in describing 
the crisis.  
 
The top managers acted within the “comfort” zone characterized by a financially-oriented mindset that 
goes well with focus of attention towards solving the liquidity problem. The top managers’ mindset 
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seems also to be related to their experience of acting as a link between the board and line managers. 
Having control over the design of MAS and budgeting procedures, top managers do not seem to have 
any big problems with using both budgets and the BSC, because BSC also has financial KPIs focusing 
on costs. Using both elements of the MAS can give a better place for maneuvering.  
 
The line managers, however, acted out of the mindset focusing on opportunities and challenges on the 
market. The line managers cannot sabotage or ignore the attention to the budget in full favor of the BSC 
because the budget is linked to their performance evaluation and rewards. In this sense, use of the BSC 
as a management tool for line managers is “suppressed” by the attention to the budget (see e.g. Mundy, 
2010). Still, line managers articulated indicators from the BSC as the most appropriate to get the 
organization out of the crisis. One explanation for this can be that in the case of “discomfort” and a 
“hopeless” current work situation induced by the crisis and the new budgeting procedures, mobilizing 
and relying on indicators from the BSC constituted a search for a new “comfort” zone. This is a search 
to find a psychological congruence between an existing market-oriented mindset and a customer-
oriented behavior that the line managers believed was needed to bring the organization out of the crisis. 
The result is tension in attention to information by the top and line managers and a disagreement 
between managerial levels regarding what actions and behavior is appropriate in order to move 
company out of the crisis. 
 
It is interesting to notice that during the situation of crisis, co-existence of both the BSC and the budget 
as one part of the MAS created an unintended consequence – the inability of top managers to mobilize 
different parts of the same MAS to get their message through the line of accountability. If the BSC had 
not been there, the line managers would probably have had less opportunity to find arguments against 
the budgets. From the point of view of MAS designers, the integration of budgets and BSC is compatible 
(Otley, 2001; Bungay & Goold, 1991). The case reported in this article shows that combining budget 
and BSC as a control tool in one package can be problematic because it can result in the incompatibility 
between mindsets and organizational behavior among decision-makers using different parts of MAS. 
This supports arguments in the literature that are critical of combining budgets and BSC into one system 
(Bogsnes, 2009; Ahn, 2001; McNair et. al. 1990).  
 
6. Conclusion 
The research problem of this article is: how in a situation of crisis can MAS create tensions in attention 
to information between top and line managers? Little research has been done so far regarding what 
information managers focus their attention on in organizations under financial distress conditions. 
Building on the case study of a company (TelCo) that experienced financial distress over several years, 
we show that top managers respond to their perceptions of the crisis and urgent demands from investors 
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and the board by tightening the budget control over the line managers. Integrated attention to cost cuts 
and an improved financial/cash flow situation were expected to follow. However, those changes in the 
budgeting processes failed to integrate top and line managers’ attention towards an improved financial 
situation. This was despite the fact that the full compliance with cost cut targets would have given line 
managers increased bonus payments. Tension in attention was visible in terms of quite different 
interpretations of both the reasons and the strategy for getting out the crisis among top and line managers 
– what we call tensions in attention. The top and line managers were torn apart between two translations 
of lack of profitability and a corresponding focus on the need for positive cash flows on the one hand, 
and flexibility, market adjustments and maintenance of the current quality of production on the other. 
 
To analyze these findings, an attention-based view of the organization and MAS is mobilized as well 
as organizational psychology literature. This article demonstrates that tightening budgetary control 
resulted in line managers contesting this new budgetary focus and wanted a focus on the BSC and the 
quality dimensions. This was evidenced by line managers’ strong emotional responses where they were 
frustrated over their new, perceived work situation that we have characterized as a “discomfort” zone. 
In describing this, the argument is that tightening budgetary control imposed a new behavior of “blind 
cost cuts” on line managers and this contradicted their existing mindset that focused on notions of the 
market, quality and customer loyalty. To find a “comfort” in a “discomfort” zone, line managers 
justified their market and customer-oriented behavior by mobilizing and paying attention to KPIs in the 
Balanced Scorecard. Articulating those KPIs rather than budgets supported their existing mindset and 
their interpretations of what behavior was important to get the company out of the crisis: focus even 
more on customers and markets. The result is tension in attention to information by the top and line 
managers and a disagreement between managerial levels regarding what actions and behavior are 
appropriate in order to move company out of the crisis.  
 
First, this article contributes to the research area that focuses on how attention is given to management 
accounting information when an organization operates in a situation of crisis (D’Aveni and MacMillan, 
1990). This article contributes to better understanding of how attention is given to management 
accounting information and how tension in attention to information is influenced by managerial 
perceptions. The study shows how and why tightened control under the situation of the crisis instead of 
integrating attention can produce tension in attention to information from MAS between the 
organizational levels. Implications for management accounting literature is that both budgeting and 
BSC represent two very different configurations of organization architecture affecting the way attention 
is channeled in the organizations. 
 
Second, this articles contributes to better understanding of how tension in attention to information is 
influenced by managerial perceptions e.g. by the level of congruence between managerial mindset and 
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behavior and, thus, their use of accounting information in “comfort” and “discomfort” zones (e.g. 
Bourmistrov & Kaarbøe, 2013). By doing that, we help to improve our understanding of the links 
between management accounting practices and the individual’s psychological processes (see e.g. Hall, 
2015). By use of Shivastava´s framework, we also showed how differently the top and the line managers 
interpreted the crisis and therefore chose different solution to the crisis.  
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Appendix 1. Organization chart of TelCo 
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Appendix 2. Overview of respondents in TelCo 
 
 
Formal interviews 
Respondent 1 CEO of TelCo 
Respondent 2 CFO of TelCo 
Respondent 3 Director, Technology, TelCo Networks/Wholesales 
Respondent 4 Director, BA Business, TelCo Market 
Respondent 5 Director, Service delivery, TelCo Networks/Wholesales 
Informal conversations 
Respondent 1 Director of operations, TelCo Networks/Wholesales 
Respondent 2 Economic director, TelCo Networks/Wholesales 
Respondent 3 Administrative director, TelCo Networks/Wholesales 
Respondent 4 Controller, TelCo Networks/Wholesales 
Respondent 5 Controller, TelCo Networks/Wholesales 
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Appendix 3. General interview guide 
 
 
This is a description of the main topics for discussion in semi-structured interviews.  
 
Theme 1 – Introduction about the context and respondents  
Presentation of interviewers and the aim of the project, including issues of research ethics 
Presentation of respondents, their background, responsibilities and daily tasks 
 
Theme 2 – Use of information 
Description of information used to handle main managerial tasks, especially in relation to: 
- Strategy work/planning 
- Budget work 
- Performance management system and incentives 
 
Theme 3 – Use of management control systems: challenges and solutions 
Perceived problems in how management control is functioning in TelCo  
Perceived reasons for these problems 
What are the ways these problems are handled/possible solutions 
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Appendix 4. A strategic map at TelCo for its Balanced Scorecard (simplified). 
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